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ABSTRACT 
As we complete the preparations for the fourth Hubble 
Space Telescope (HST) servicing mission, we note an 
anniversary approaching:  it was 30 years ago in July 
that the first HST payload safety review panel meeting 
was held.  This, in turn, was just over a year after the 
very first payload safety review, a Phase 0 review for 
the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite and its Inertial 
Upper Stage, held in June of 1977. 
 
In adapting a process that had been used in the review 
and certification of earlier Skylab payloads, National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
engineers sought to preserve the lessons learned in the 
development of technical payload safety requirements, 
while creating a new process that would serve the very 
different needs of the new space shuttle program.  Their 
success in this undertaking is substantiated by the fact 
that this process and these requirements have proven to 
be remarkably robust, flexible, and adaptable. 
Furthermore, the payload safety process has, to date, 
served us well in the critical mission of safeguarding 
our astronauts, cosmonauts, and spaceflight participants. 
Both the technical requirements and their interpretation, 
as well as the associated process requirements have 
grown, evolved, been streamlined, and have been 
adapted to fit multiple programs, including the 
International Space Station (ISS) program, the 
Shuttle/Mir program, and most recently the United 
States Constellation program.   
 
From its earliest days, it was anticipated that the 
payload safety process would be international in scope, 
and so it has been.   European Space Agency (ESA), 
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), 
German Space Agency (DLR), Canadian Space 
Agency (CSA), Russian Space Agency (RSA), and 
many additional countries have flown payloads on both 
the space shuttle and on the ISS.  Our close cooperation 
and long-term working relationships have culminated in 
the franchising of the payload safety review process 
itself to our partners in ESA, which in turn will serve as 
a roadmap for extending the franchise to other Partners.  
 
But what may we say then, about the future of payload 
safety?  Where are we going?  While its heyday may 
indeed be yet to come, with three large laboratories now 
up and running on board the ISS, beyond that, the future 
holds both great opportunities, and even greater 
challenges.  As we move beyond Earth orbit, constraints 
on upmass will begin to impact the way we select 
payloads for flight, as well as the way in which we 
design them.  Current projections for the Altair Lunar 
Lander indicate that only 500 kg will be reserved for 
cargo to the lunar surface, and only 150 kg for return, 
with only two missions planned per year. Further, it 
should be recognized that out of this small amount, 
some mass will need to be dedicated to payload 
secondary structure, so the actual mass to and from the 
lunar surface will be even less. When compared to the 
approximately 25,000 kg of payload upmass that can be 
accommodated by the space shuttle (with an average of 
four flights per year), it is clear that opportunities for 
flying payloads beyond Earth orbit will be extremely 
limited. It is also clear that manifest trades will become 
absolutely critical, as every kilogram of payload cargo 
will be displacing critically needed consumables and 
equipment.  We presume that strict criteria for scientific 
merit will be invoked to assure that only the most 
significant experimentation is performed.   
 
And while two-fault tolerance has long been the 
hallmark of the NASA payload safety program, mass 
constraints may force a rethinking of basic fault 
tolerance requirements, just as the design of the Altair 
vehicle itself is, in many cases, zero-fault tolerant and 
has adopted a risk informed design philosophy across 
the board.  Such an approach may well be required for 
all payloads destined for the lunar surface.   
 
Finally, everything we take to the moon must work.  
There is no such thing as a category D payload, or a 
piece of Criticality 3 hardware.  A fifty-kilogram 
payload on the surface of the moon that fails to function 
represents ten percent of the total lunar cargo downmass 
that could have been used to transport oxygen, or 
critical repair parts, or another payload that would have 
functioned properly.  Reliability requirements may well 
find their place alongside safety requirements in the 
effort to assure that every device we take to the lunar 
surface is able to perform its intended function.   
 
Understanding the origin and the evolution of payload 
safety technical requirements as well as the payload 
safety process, can help guide our understanding of how 
they may evolve in the future, as they are once again 
adapted to meet the needs of a very different program:  
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 payload safety in transit between the Earth and the 
Moon, on lunar sortie missions, and as a part of a 
program of investigation and experimentation in a lunar 
outpost. 
 
1. ORIGINS 
In June of 1977, the Payload Safety Review Panel 
(PSRP) convened for the first time to review the hazards 
associated with a Space Shuttle payload. The payload in 
question was the Inertial Upper Stage/Tracking and 
Data Relay Satellite (IUS/TDRS).  The task before them 
was formidable.  The IUS was a large two stage solid 
fuel upper stage, which would be used to propel the 
TDRS satellite from low earth orbit to its final 
geosynchronous operational altitude.  The TDRS itself 
used a hydrazine propellant system for attitude control.  
The entire IUS/TDRS stack would have to be erected 
and then deployed from the payload bay of the Space 
Shuttle orbiter. The first stage would then need to be 
ignited, while still no more than a few miles from the 
orbiter.  The technical requirements used in the review 
still existed only as a “white paper” (“Initial Issue of 
Safety Policy and Requirements for Payloads Using the 
Space Transportation System”, dated June 16, 1976.)   
No detailed process requirements were yet officially 
documented.  But this was the beginning of a process 
that resulted in the safe and successful flight of five 
TDRS satellites on the space shuttle, and countless other 
payloads in 125 different space shuttle missions, ten 
years of ISS operations, and seven Increments on the 
Russian Mir space station. It did not spring into being 
fully formed on that day in 1977, and it would change 
significantly over the years, but by understanding the 
origins of that process, and by studying how it has 
changed, we can prepare ourselves to deal with some of 
the challenges that lie ahead, in assuring the safety of 
payload activities that we pursue beyond earth orbit. 
 
The roots of Payload Safety as we know it today can be 
traced back to the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA)  Skylab program (1973-74).  
The Skylab space station hosted three crews, who 
performed a variety of experiments, during a total of 
178 days on-orbit.  NASA and its SR&QA contractor 
(Boeing) established a small team of Skylab experiment 
safety engineers, who traveled to the development 
centers for each experiment, and supported every 
experiment design review with the sole purpose of 
assuring the safety of these experiments.  There were no 
documented payload/experiment safety requirements; 
they just depended on these senior safety engineers to 
assure that hazards associated with Skylab payload 
operations were properly identified and controlled.   
 
With the conclusion of the Skylab Program, and the 
advent of the Space Shuttle, this team of engineers 
(most notably Robert (Bobby) Miller from NASA, and 
William (Bill) Powell and James (Jim) Mello from 
Boeing) turned their attention to the question of assuring 
the safety of Space Shuttle payloads.  They knew that 
the approach they had used during Skylab was 
impractical – Skylab had a defined ending date, and a 
known, finite number of experiments, all of which 
would be flown within less than a two year period.  The 
Shuttle Program, however, was open-ended, with a 
vastly greater scope – far more payloads, far more 
hazards, a much wider variety of potential experiments, 
and an international customer base.  It was clear that 
their traveling team of safety engineers could not 
support such a program – the travel requirements alone 
would exceed any reasonable expectations for funding.  
Instead, a centralized panel would review all payloads 
from a single location, and payload organizations would 
travel to the Johnson Space Center in support of their 
safety reviews.  Thus was born the concept of the 
Payload Safety Review Panel – A group of technical 
experts, led by a Chairman from the Program Office, 
who would review all Shuttle payloads for safety.  The 
idea of a phased approach to safety reviews followed 
naturally, because the developers of the process tended 
to think in terms of supporting design reviews.  From 
these two concepts came JSC 13830 “Implementation 
Procedure for STS System Safety Requirements”, dated 
May 1979 – the first document defining the process for 
first delivering the data necessary to support payload 
safety reviews, and then conducting payload safety 
reviews.  In parallel, the team was also developing the 
safety policy and technical requirements for payloads.  
Since they knew that it was not feasible to impose 
NASA quality and reliability standards on the paying 
customers of the Shuttle, they decided to adopt a strict 
policy of defense in depth (fault tolerance), plus design 
to minimum risk, where fault tolerance was infeasible. 
The initial thrust of the early requirements was directed 
at upper stages such as the IUS, the Centaur, and the 
PAM (Payload Assist Module), and at the first major 
Shuttle-launched satellites – the Hughes 376, the TDRS, 
and the interplanetary missions such as Magellan, 
Galileo, and Ulysses, with much attention focused on 
such things as rotation of safe and arm devices, 
monitoring of inhibits, and the opening of propellant 
isolation valves.   
 
2. EVOLUTION 
The first version of the NHB 1700.7 was released in 
May of 1979.  A revision followed quickly (December 
of ’80), then again in January of ’89.  The ISS 
Addendum was released in December of ’95.  Payload 
safety requirements have been adapted for many uses – 
for the Shuttle/Mir Program, as the starting point for the 
Space Station Safety requirements, and as the basis for 
NASA Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) safety 
requirements. They have been revised, improved, 
clarified, interpreted, streamlined, and sometimes 
 deleted.  In general, the PSRP has consistently worked 
to streamline the payload safety review process as well 
as the technical requirements both to create efficiencies 
for the customers of the process (the payload 
organizations), and to allow the panel to focus on the 
most significant hazards for a given payload.   
 
 
2.1. Interpretation 
The guiding philosophy behind the development of 
payload safety technical requirements has always been 
to leave payload organizations as free as possible to 
design their payloads as they wished, without 
unnecessary constraint.  This proved to be a less than 
satisfactory approach, and resulted in what we at NASA 
often refer to as the “Bring me a rock” syndrome, where 
a payload organization would repeatedly present designs 
to the PSRP, only to be told that the designs were 
unacceptable.  A good example of this is associated with 
the selection of circuit protection devices.  Designers 
naturally wanted to protect wires from overcurrents, but 
tended to want to err on the side of sizing such devices 
larger rather than smaller, to prevent loss of function in 
the event of a current spike. The PSRP, on the other 
hand, wanted to err on the side of caution, and protect 
the space shuttle from a potential fire by requiring 
circuit protection devices to be sized smaller.  This 
resulted in much frustration, until the PSRP finally 
issued NSTS 18798, “Interpretations of NSTS Payload 
Safety Requirements”. Where requirements were open-
ended or ambiguous, the Interpretations document 
provided guidance and clarification.  The document is 
actually a collection of formal letters and memoranda 
documenting panel positions on a wide variety of 
requirements, which had often been in use by the PSRP 
internally for years before eventual dissemination to the 
payload community. Interpretations continue to be 
promulgated, updated, and refined to this day.   
 
2.2. Streamlining 
In 1995, the PSRP began an effort to evaluate whether 
payload safety reviews could be streamlined, so as to 
spend less time on some (presumably less hazardous) 
payloads, while allowing the panel to spend more time 
focusing on unique and significant hazards.  This effort 
gave rise to the development of the Form 1230, “Flight 
Payload Standardized Hazard Report,” often referred to 
as the Payload Hazard Report EZ.  This effort was also 
accompanied by an attempt to reduce the number of 
reviews held to assess the safety of a payload.  Up until 
that time, all payloads went through four reviews, 
starting with Phase 0 and proceeding through Phase III, 
although reviews were sometimes combined together 
(e.g., a combined Phase I and II safety review.)  This 
further reduced workload on both the PSRP and on the 
payload community, and allowed even more focus on 
truly hazardous payloads.  In addition, an effort was 
begun to approve hazard reports outside of the formal 
panel meetings, resulting in even more time savings.  In 
support of these efforts, the panel created three 
categories of payloads: Basic, Intermediate, and 
Complex, to allow discrimination between simple, non-
hazardous flight articles, and larger, more complex and 
hazardous payloads.  In general, the initial thought was 
that hazard reports would be required only for those 
payload hazards that were unique, that is, hazards with 
controls and verifications that are not generic in nature.  
In other words, if all of your hazards were generic, you 
could fill out the Form 1230, have one review, and be 
done.  Unique hazards would require additional reviews, 
up to the full complement of three or more phased 
safety reviews.  While these categories have undergone 
some modification over the years, they remain 
essentially the same, and today are defined as follows: 
 
2.2.1. Basic Payloads 
• All identified hazards and their hazard controls are 
“standard” as specified on JSC Form 1230 “Flight 
Payload Standardized Hazard Control Report” 
• No unique hazards / hazard reports (HR) 
• Usually an informal Out-of-board review by PSRP 
Chairman 
 
2.2.2. Intermediate Payloads 
• In addition to the Form 1230 standard hazards, the 
payload has unique hazards and requires unique 
HR’s 
• Unique hazards have proven and/or passive 
controls and standard verification methods 
• One or two formal safety reviews with the PRSP 
• Typically one face-to-face and one via telecon 
 
2.2.3. Complex Payloads 
• In addition to the Form 1230 standard hazards and 
unique passively controlled hazards, the payload 
also has unique hazards with active controls/must 
work functions, operational hazard controls; or 
passive hazards with non-standard control and 
verification methods 
• Three or more formal safety reviews with the PSRP 
• Typically face-to-face reviews, but telecons may be 
held after the first review if appropriate 
• Splinter and/or Working Group meetings with 
technical support may be required before and 
during reviews to discuss major issues 
 
Coincidentally, at about this same time, a similar effort 
was underway to develop a scheme for categorizing 
cargo that would be carried up by the Shuttle to the 
Russian Mir space station.  RSA/Boris Sotnikov, 
working with NASA/Gary W. Johnson and others  to 
develop a proposal for dividing all cargo into two 
 categories.  In a similar fashion to that described above, 
Category1 items would be those with no hazards, 
controls and verifications other than those listed in what 
is now the JF 907 checklist.  Category 1 items would be 
certified by the providing organization only, with an 
information copy provided to the other partner.  Any 
items with unique, non-generic hazards would require 
the submittal of hazard reports, and the hazard reports 
and the associated certification would require approval 
by both partners.  This process too, is still in use today.   
 
2.3. ISS Addendum 
The payload requirements established in NSTS 1700.7, 
Safety Policy and Requirements for Payloads Using the 
Space Transportation System preceded the development 
of the ISS.  As the ISS was beginning to prepare for 
utilization of the orbiting laboratory, there was a need to 
provide payload developers the appropriate safety 
requirements.  In January 1989, an addendum to NSTS 
1700.7 was developed to expand and modify existing 
Space Shuttle payload requirements for ISS 
applicability.  The addendum included labeling of each 
paragraph to relate the applicability compared to Space 
Shuttle payload requirements.  This approach prevented 
duplication of payload requirements documents and 
enabled the addendum to address ISS unique 
requirements.  NSTS 1700.7 and the ISS addendum 
together provide requirements that enable development 
of safe payloads for STS transportation phases, Space 
Shuttle operations, and ISS on-orbit operations.  
Additionally, the addendum approach leveraged payload 
organizations’ familiarity with STS requirements.   With 
the impending retirement of the Space Shuttle, the 
requirements are planned to be restructured to eliminate 
the Space Shuttle addendum approach. 
 
So it can be seen that over the years, there have been 
many efforts made to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the payload safety process.  These 
efforts have been primarily in three areas:  providing 
clarification and interpretations of technical 
requirements, reducing or combining the number of 
safety reviews required, and reducing the number of 
hazard reports required for submittal.  Another 
significant step is currently in work:  The effort to 
“Franchise” the payload safety process, whereby the 
authority to conduct safety reviews is ceded to 
international partners.  This will be discussed in greater 
detail later. 
  
 
3. THE PRESENT 
Dividing the Shuttle program history into three distinct 
phases allows us to recognize how payload priorities 
and risk posture has changed over the years.  The first 
phase occurred prior to the Challenger accident.  During 
this phase, capability was proved and we rapidly moved 
into complex scientific accomplishments.  The Shuttle 
era of space exploration began in April 1981 with 
Columbia’s first voyage into space.  The Shuttle’s first 
scientific payload was flown aboard the same vehicle 
just seven months later.  The payload consisted of 
remote sensing instruments which provided an 
evaluation of Earth resources, environment quality and 
weather conditions.  As our experience grew, so did the 
complexity of payloads.  During June 1983, Shuttle 
Pallet Satellite (SPAS-l) built by Messerschmitt-
Bolkow-Blohm, a German aerospace firm, flew beside 
and above the Shuttle for several hours recording 
images of various orbiter maneuvers.  In 1984, the first 
capture, repair and redeploy of a malfunctioning 
satellite was successfully accomplished.  The EVA 
crewmember flew to the satellite using the Manned 
Maneuvering Unit (MMU) and attempted to capture it 
with the Trunnion Pin Acquisition Device (TPAD).   
After three attempts, the satellite began to tumble and 
the effort was halted.  Eventually, ground controllers 
were able to stabilize the tumbling action providing a 
second opportunity the following day to grapple the 
satellite with the Shuttle Remote Manipulator System 
SRMS.  It was successful, and resulted in the first repair 
mission of an orbiting satellite; the Solar Maximum 
Mission (Solar Max) satellite launched 4 years earlier. 
 Following the Challenger accident, President Reagan 
directed that the shuttle cease carrying commercial 
satellite payloads and expendable launch vehicles to be 
greater utilized for placing satellites into space.  
Additionally, payload requirements were revised to 
reflect the increased safety awareness brought about by 
the Challenger accident.   
During the post Challenger era although there was an 
increased safety and risk awareness, some very complex 
and challenging missions were conducted.  For 
example, in 1989 the Galileo Planetary mission included 
an orbiting spacecraft launched into the inner solar 
system from the Shuttle using an inertial upper stage 
rocket.   To achieve the power needs, solar panels 65 m2 
in size would have been required along with 
unacceptably massive batteries.  As a result, the payload 
utilized two radioisotope thermoelectric generators 
which powered the payload through the radioactive 
decay of plutonium-238. The heat emitted by this decay 
was converted into electricity providing a reliable and 
long-lasting source of electricity unaffected by the cold 
space environment and high radiation fields.  More than 
100 scientists from the United States, Great Britain, 
Germany, France, Canada and Sweden conducted 
Galileo experiments. As commitments prior to the 
Challenger accident were completed, the focus shifted 
toward development of a space station.  In June 1995, 
the third mission of the US/Russian Shuttle-MIR 
 Program, the Shuttle docked to the MIR creating the 
largest spacecraft ever in orbit.  By December 1998, 
building of the International Space Station was 
underway with the attachment of Node 1 to the orbiting 
Functional Cargo Block (FGB.)    
After the Columbia accident, President Bush called for 
the retirement of the space shuttle after completion of 
the International Space Station.  As the ISS nears 
completion, the payload focus has moved to ISS 
utilization.  At completion, the ISS is slated to have five 
laboratories, the US Destiny, the European Columbus, 
and Japanese Kibo, the Russian Multipurpose 
Laboratory Module and Mini-Research Module 2.   
3.1. Franchising, the Challenge of Consistency 
The PSRP franchising effort initiated in June 2002 will 
facilitate the increasing volume of payload reviews 
required with the presence of five orbiting laboratories.  
One challenge the franchised panels face is maintaining 
consistency with requirement implementation and 
interpretations.  Charters and Memorandums of 
Agreement have been established which outline planned 
process audits and joint safety reviews.  Relationships 
between panel experts have been established to help 
provide consistency across the panels.  With more 
laboratories to conduct science and increased partner 
vehicle traffic to the ISS, franchising complexity 
increases.  Open communication between the panels, 
safety engineers and topic experts will be the 
cornerstone of maintaining consistent safety 
assessments.  The ability to understand and implement 
lessons learned from one another will be of utmost 
importance in an ever growing busy environment.  
Close attention to the details is extremely important;  
knowing who is responsible for the equipment 
configuration and understanding what, if any changes, 
have been implemented.  Identifying all features that 
may present hazards when incorporated in the ISS 
environment and assuring that all relevant parties have a 
common understanding must be accomplished to 
maintain a safe ISS.  The implementation of franchised 
safety reviews will truly present challenges that, when 
safely accomplished, will be a great achievement. 
 
4. THE FUTURE 
The future of payload safety will see an extreme path 
bifurcation.  Payloads destined for the ISS will continue 
to enjoy a wealth of available space, upmass, electrical 
power, and many different opportunities for transport, 
with up to seven possible transport vehicles, even after 
the retirement of the Shuttle (Soyuz, Progress, ATV, 
HTV, Orion, Dragon, and Cygnus.)  There is every 
expectation that the efforts that have characterized 
payload safety to date, i.e., efforts to continuously 
search for efficiencies and cost-saving measures, will 
continue, and that the worldwide payload community 
will reap the benefits of these activities in reduced costs.   
Efforts to franchise the process will continue, as well as 
efforts to streamline and ensure consistency in the 
approach to mutual multilateral certification.  The ISS 
will no doubt prove to be a space laboratory of great 
effectiveness, with many, many users throughout the 
world.   
 
But what about payload operations beyond the ISS?  
What about payloads operated on the surface of the 
moon, or en route to the moon?  It is safe to say, even 
from this distant vantage point, that payload operations 
on the lunar surface and payload safety in particular, 
will look very different indeed, and for one simple 
reason:  severe limitations on down mass to the lunar 
surface.  Although the Altair Project is still in its 
infancy, current projections indicate that there will be 
two manned missions to the lunar surface per year, with 
500 kg allocated for payload mass per mission. This is 
actually a total figure, and out of this must be subtracted 
mass for structural supports, containers, foam, etc., so 
that the actual payload mass to the lunar surface will be 
somewhat less. Two additional unmanned, “cargo-only” 
flights, capable of delivering 14.5 metric tons to the 
lunar surface may also be conducted, although there are 
no figures available on the amount of that mass which 
will be made available to payload activities.  Experience 
tells us however, that this number will be highly 
variable, and also highly dependent on the immediate 
needs of the lunar surface outpost for consumables, 
spares, replacement parts, and new equipment critical to 
the functioning of the outpost.  This severe limitation on 
mass and space (payload volume) has many 
implications: 
 
4.1. Scientific Merit 
Only the most productive, meaningful, and scientifically 
desirable experiments will be flown to the lunar surface.  
While today each partner in the ISS has their own 
methods for evaluating scientific merit, it is a sure bet 
that this process will become far more stringent when 
applied to lunar surface payloads.   
 
4.2. Reliability 
Payload requirements for reliability in the Shuttle and 
the ISS Programs have typically been left entirely to the 
discretion of the payload owner, with predictable 
results: some payloads have performed reliably and 
well; others have failed almost upon reaching orbit.  
This will have to change.  We will not be able to afford 
to take anything to the moon that is not designed to 
provide the maximum chance of successful operation.  
Everything we take to the moon must work.  A fifty-
kilogram payload that fails on the lunar surface has just 
displaced fifty kilograms of air, food, water, or 
 desperately needed spares.  Discussions with the Altair 
Project Manager Laurie Hansen confirm that a set of 
reliability requirements aimed at payloads, and 
documenting the need for the appropriate design 
philosophies, analysis requirements, parts selection 
procedures, etc. is highly likely.  This in turn will 
necessitate a set of reviews aimed at assuring 
compliance with these requirements, well beyond the 
scope of current payload safety reviews.   
 
4.3. Safety Requirements Philosophy 
Ultimately, the severe constraints on mass for lunar 
payloads may even impact the philosophy for assuring 
the safety of lunar payloads.  During the Shuttle/ISS era, 
we have depended on a philosophy of defense in depth 
(fault tolerance) as well as design to minimum risk 
(materials selection, factors of safety on structures and 
pressure vessels, etc.) to assure the safety of payloads.  
This too, may have to change.  In the Altair Project 
today, the vehicle design was stripped down to only 
those functions absolutely required to perform the 
mission of the vehicle.  Redundancy was then added 
back in on a case-by-case basis, evaluating complex 
trades among functionality, safety, reliability, and mass 
for each vehicle function under consideration.  Single 
fault tolerance has been achieved for most cases; zero 
fault tolerance is still present in some cases, offset by 
dependence on extreme reliability.   
 
For payloads, requirements for factors of safety in 
structures and pressure vessels will almost certainly 
have to be revisited.  But what about fault tolerance?  
Adding redundancy adds weight, and in some cases 
reduces reliability.  Will we retreat to single fault 
tolerance, given extensive insight into inherent 
reliability?  Or will we, perhaps, adopt an approach of 
picking risk “targets” as is currently done in the 
Constellation Program in lieu of prescriptive 
requirements for fault tolerance?   
 
The adoption of such an approach would come with a 
significant price tag.  First, risk targets (i.e., probability 
of causing Loss of Crew of no greater than 1-in-
100,000, for example) would have to be allocated to 
each payload.  Then trade studies would have to be 
conducted to determine the most effective and least 
costly (in terms of mass) means of achieving that target.  
Then analyses and tests would have to be performed to 
verify that requirements had been met.  Designs might 
ultimately consist of a mixture of two-fault tolerance, 
design to minimum risk, and high reliability.  
Arguments for reliability in lieu of fault tolerance would 
need to be supported by detailed analysis, and would 
require extensive review, all of which points to a 
lengthy and expensive process.   
 
4.4. Commonality and Interoperability 
While it may never be ensconced in formal 
requirements, the desire for common parts in a mass-
constrained environment cannot be overstated.  On the 
ISS, when the Elektron vacuum vent valve became 
contaminated, the Russians were able to re-plumb the 
Elektron vacuum line to the vent valve for the Harmful 
Contaminants Filter, which was identical.  This practical 
and robust approach simultaneously simplifies sparing 
logistics, and creates options for recovery in the event of 
a parts failure.   
 
 
5. SUMMARY 
In adapting a process that had been used in the review 
and certification of earlier Skylab payloads, NASA 
engineers sought to preserve the lessons they had 
learned in the development of technical payload safety 
requirements, while creating a new process that would 
serve the very different needs of the new Space Shuttle 
program.  Their success in this undertaking is attested to 
by the fact that this process and these requirements have 
proven to be remarkably robust, flexible, and adaptable. 
Furthermore, the payload safety process has, to date, 
served us well in the critical mission of safeguarding 
our astronauts, cosmonauts, and spaceflight participants. 
Both the technical requirements and their 
interpretations, as well as the associated process 
requirements have grown, evolved, been streamlined, 
and have been adapted to fit multiple programs, 
including the International Space Station program, the 
Shuttle/Mir program, and most recently the US 
Constellation program.   
 
Understanding the origin and the evolution of payload 
safety technical requirements as well as the payload 
safety process, can help guide our understanding of how 
they may evolve in the future, as they are once again 
adapted to meet the needs of a very different program:  
payload safety in transit between the Earth and the 
Moon, on lunar sortie missions, and as a part of a 
program of investigation and experimentation in a lunar 
outpost. 
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